ESRG

ENERGY SAFETY RESPONSE GROUP

PLUS POWER - CRANBERRY POINT ENERGY STORAGE PROJECT: EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN (ERP)

Draft ERP 3 August 2021 Version 1.0

Summary

This document is an emergency response plan for the Plus Power - Cranberry Point Energy Storage Project located at 31R Main St., Carver, MA 02330.

This ERP provides information and instruction to guide first responders in preparing for and safely responding to an accident, fire, or other emergency associated with the Cranberry Point Energy Storage Project.

Life safety shall be the highest priority during any type of event.

Important Note on Document Status

This document will remain as a "DRAFT" and is subject to further update, and will be finalized upon completion of the construction and commissioning of the Cranberry Point Energy Storage Project

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Document Review, Issuance and Revisions

Reviewed by:

Paul Rogers, Principal Founder **Energy Safety Response Group (ESRG)** **_____** **Date: _____**	**Casey Grant, P.E., Senior Consultant** **Energy Safety Response Group (ESRG)** **_____** **Date: _____**

Issuance and Revision Summary:

Action	Version	Date	Description / Comment
Issuance	1.0	3 August 2021	Initial issuance of draft document for review.
Revision			
Revision			
Revision			

Note: The information in this ERP is subject to change while in draft status, potentially due to modifications to equipment or other factors affecting the design of the system.

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1) Site Overview

Project Owner:

Applicant – Cranberry Point Energy Storage, LLC (developed by Plus Power, LLC)
Owner – Cranberry Point Energy Storage, LLC
Site Area – 186,436 SF
Current Use – Undeveloped; wooded (Cranberry bogs to the south of Project Site)
Proposed Use – Battery Energy Storage System

Site Location:

31R Main St., Carver, MA 02330; located next to Eversource substation.

Equipment on Site:

- Major equipment on site will consist of up to 128 cabinet style enclosures containing lithium-ion batteries. PCS and thermal management systems are integrated into the battery enclosure and not separate equipment. Included are 58 MV step up transformers.
- 150MW/300MWh system located in Carver, MA that will be interconnecting to the Eversource grid at 115kV, adjacent to a large substation.
- BESS equipment on site will consist of up to 1.0 MW and 3.0 MWh battery energy storage system (BESS) free-standing enclosures. Each BESS battery enclosure has up to 20 modules, _____thermal management units, an AC auxiliary power distribution system, a DC power distribution system. The output voltage of each enclosure is approximately 480 VAC.
- The AC output of the inverter (PCS) is connected to the low side of the medium voltage transformer. The high side of the medium voltage transformer is connected to the electric grid.
- None of the enclosures are intended to be entered.
- Only onsite personnel present will be for maintenance purposes.
- No onsite disconnect outside of the BESS inverter local disconnect.
- Responder Knox box location: At the Northern entrance gate near the cell tower (TBD). It contains the following information: TBD

2) Emergency Contacts

Local & State Emergency Response Agencies:

Emergency: 911

Carver Fire Department:

Address: 99 Main St., Carver, MA 02330
Phone: 508-866-3440 (non-emergency)

- Deputy Chief Eric Germaine
- Assistant Deputy Chief Jesse Boyle (code enforcement officer)

https://carverfire.org/company/chief-officers/

Carver, MA Police Department:

Address: 112 Main Street, Carver, Massachusetts, 02330
Phone: 508-866-2000

Local Hospital: Beth Israel Deaconess Hospital in Plymouth, 275 Sandwich St, Plymouth, MA 02360 - 24 hr emergency room

Local Trauma Center: South Shore Hospital, 55 Fogg Rd, South Weymouth, MA 02190 - Level II Trauma Center

Local Burn Center: Massachusetts General Hospital 55 Fruit St GRB 1300, Boston, MA 02114 (likely would transport aeromedical unless conditions prevented)

BESS Emergency Call Center: Tesla for the BESS emergency
Available 24/7: 1-650-681-6060

Subject Matter Expert (SME) Chris Quaranta, Director - Engineering & Construction, Plus Power (until NOC or O&M contract in place; additional SME to be determined)

3) Site Map



Figure 1 – Cranberry Point Energy Storage Project



Figure 2 – Carver, MA Fire Department Response Distance

Figure 3 – Conceptual Drawing

Figure 4 – Conceptual Drawing

Figure 5 – East Side of Site Looking South (view as of 13/Jul/2021)

Figure 6 – Southwest View towards Cell Tower (view as of 13/Jul/2021)

Figure 7 – North of Site – View to the West of Eversource Substation (view as of 13/Jul/2021)

4) System Specific Fire Protection & Safety Controls

4.1) Condition Monitoring & Alarming:

Conditions inside the Tesla Megapack system are continuously measured for temperature, current, state of charge, and voltage sensor information, and can be accessed remotely through the Network Operations Center (NOC). Although the data is also available on the LCD screen on each enclosure, the screen on the exterior of the unit **shall not be approached when risk of fire or explosion exists.**

Fire detection for each BESS unit consists of Battery Management System (BMS) data available through the NOC and an external multi-spectrum infrared camera for the site. Upon detection of an overtemperature or fire incident, the alarm condition will be transmitted to a Network Operations Center and a Central Monitoring Station that will in turn send an alarm to the Carver FD Dispatch Center. The following is an example of a typical infrared camera mounted to a pole for exterior detection of heat and fire events emanating from a Megapack Unit:

Figure 8 – Example of Thermal Camera for Fire Detection

4.2) Considerations for Incidents and Emergencies

4.2.1) Incidents

For inverter faults, isolation faults, and internal loss of communication that prevent the safe operation of the system, Tesla's monitoring system will automatically alert the Tesla NOC to initiate a corrective action remotely or to dispatch an in-person field visit. The project will also have an O&M provider and 24/7 NOC in place prior to the system going live, which will also be monitoring these conditions.

4.2.2) Emergencies

4.2.2.1) Thermal Runaway/Fire

For the Tesla Megapack, testing has shown that a propagating thermal runaway event due to internal causes is very unlikely due to physical internal separation elements and the battery module's design, which requires multiple co-located cells to go into runaway at the same time.

External factors, including a large impact that damages many cells at once or a pro-longed exposure to an intense external fire, could create a propagating thermal runaway event that may spread throughout the entire enclosure.

In such a case, it is likely that all battery modules will consume themselves. **In the event of a fire, the design approach is for the Megapack contents to be fully consumed based upon data from UL 9540A installation level tests.**

If a propagating thermal runaway occurs, over-temperature faults isolate the concerned Megapack by first disconnecting the affected battery module, and then opening the AC contactors. All faults are monitored passively by the Tesla computer system which then will be relayed to the NOC that will review and act accordingly. This NOC is TBD prior to commissioning.

While testing has shown that the system performs in a safe and controlled manner, fully consuming itself slowly over a period of a few hours, without explosive bursts, deflagrations, or unexpected hazards, the decision to apply external suppression to the troubled enclosure and adjacent units is **ultimately at the discretion of the incident commander.**

4.2.2.2) Explosion / Deflagration Control

Tesla utilizes over-pressure vents and a proprietary sparker system to manage potential deflagration.



Figure 9 – Tesla Megapack – View 1

Figure 10 – Tesla Megapack – View 2

Tesla's proprietary sparker system prevents a dangerous buildup of gases within the enclosure by combusting flammable off-gases during a runaway event.

The vents mitigate the effects of over-pressure by directing all gases, smoke, and flame out of the top of Megapack and ensure the front doors remain shut for the safety of nearby exposures and personnel. The vents are passive and are not actuated or controlled. Their rubber seals are designed to release over-pressure events (including arc flash events) or melt out during thermal runaway events.

Co-located with the vents are one-way "umbrella" valves that help exhaust and disperse runaway gases to help minimize gas concentrations inside the enclosure.

Emergency responders and others may observe a continual sparking within cabinets at certain locations. This is a normal operational feature of the unit, i.e., the "sparker system", which is part of the automatic safety system to prevent a dangerous build-up of gases within the enclosure.

The sparker system is always on and is powered by internal battery power, and thus will remain operational even during loss of grid power or if an external shutdown is triggered for the battery equipment. If an event were to occur under these conditions, the sparker system and corresponding overpressure vents would still operate as described.

5) Potential Hazards

There are five major risks posed by lithium-ion battery failures. They are electric shock, arc flash, fire, explosion, and the by-product from off-gassing. During failure, a lithium-ion battery may emit tens to hundreds of liters of off gas, and larger failures may emit thousands of liters of gas.

Indicators which may provide insight into what is happening or about to happen during an incident may include:
- *Smoke or flame*
- *Change in smoke color.*
- *Change in velocity or volume of smoke production.*
- *Sounds – popping and/or hissing sounds.*
- *Smell – sweet smell*

- **Electrical equipment** – Electrical equipment shall always be treated as energized. Associated hazards include electric shock, arc flash, and fire.

- **Overhead power lines** – Overhead power lines shall always be treated as energized. Associated hazards include electric shock, arc flash, and fire. For locations see facility site plan, Appendix C.

- **BESS electrical equipment** – BESS electrical equipment including batteries shall always be treated as energized. A BESS does not have a single point of disconnect to electrically isolate all components from each other. There are disconnects that will de-energize select parts of the system, but the batteries themselves will remain energized.

- **BESS battery fire** – Battery fires present unique hazards, including stranded energy and re-ignition risk.

- **BESS off-gassing** – Lithium-ion batteries release flammable and toxic chemicals when subjected to electrical or physical damage, including fire. Chemicals released can also pose an inhalation hazard.

Typical composition of off-gassing event may include:
- *High concentrations (>10%)*
  - *Hydrogen*
  - *Carbon Monoxide*
  - *Carbon Dioxide*
- *Lower Concentrations (<10%)*
  - *Methane*
  - *Ethane*
  - *Other flammable hydrocarbons*

- **BESS explosion/deflagration** – Although the approach that is taken with the Tesla Megapack mitigates the buildup of gases by burning them from the outset of any potential release, responders should be aware that unexpected situations may arise and a safe standoff distance from the troubled enclosure is recommended.

- **Water run-off** – Water run-off could be considered contaminated, and all efforts should be taken to minimize unnecessary firefighting water contamination of the surrounding environment. Robust drainage and water run-off features are included in the design of the facility to capture credible worst case water discharge. Two water runoff containment areas, known as infiltration basins are provided. One will be installed in the Western Storage area, and one will be installed in the Eastern Storage area. The basins are designed to provide water quality treatment and to control the peak discharge from 2-year and 10-year storms. In the

event of a fire or emergency the basins are designed to capture and contain water runoff from potential cooling efforts to the BESS units adjacent to the troubled enclosure that may be smoking or burning. The design specifically avoids runoff towards the adjacent Cranberry Bogs. It is not anticipated, nor advised, that special extinguishing agents such as foam should be used throughout the incident. A plan, similar to an electrical substation Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasure (SPCC) will be put in place to contain and remove from the site runoff from these areas throughout the life of the incident.[1]

6) Potential Site-Specific Hazards

- **Residential Exposures** - Potential site risks to the local community are minimal due to the remote location and nature of the site. Private residences in the vicinity are remote with the closest residence approximately 400 feet to the west of the project site's fence line. However, the closest proposed battery enclosures are approximately 650' away, and are sufficiently distant such that smoke or off-gas from the battery container are not expected to pose a risk.

- **Electrical Substation** – The BESS project is in the vicinity is an Eversource Carver Substation. The exposure threat between these facilities is minimal. If necessary, protective measures should be taken for the electrical substation. This includes taking requisite protective measures, including sufficient standoff distances, using fog patterns for hose lines with only potable water, and other precautions for energized electrical equipment.

- **Adjacent Buildings and Structures** - Nearby is a Cell Tower and service structures, and these are normally not occupied but may contain its own battery system and electrical equipment. The outside of these structures should be monitored and cooled should it be necessary.

- **Wetlands and Cranberry Bogs** – Nearby wetlands require special consideration for firefighting water discharge control. The BESS project is located outside of the 100’ buffer zone for run-off. The nearest cranberry bog is located approximately 60' to the South of the nearest BESS unit.

- **Surrounding Wooded Area** – The BESS project location will be cleared approximately _50 ft from BESS project and maintained free of foliage and growth. Access roads are indicated in the Appendix in Figure C1. The access pathways throughout the Project site will be gravel/crushed stone. Emergency access path is planned from Eversource's existing Carver substation to the north of the site.

[1] Additional Information on water runoff containment can be found in the Stormwater Report produced by AECOM Environmental Engineers for the Cranberry Point Energy Storage Project.

7) Required Personal Protective Equipment

Full firefighter protective gear shall be worn in any response to a fire and/or explosion event or any indication a fire may be present. This shall include proper use of Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA).

If no fire or explosion risk is present, AR protective clothing to protect against arc flash and shock shall be worn. Jewelry such as necklaces shall be removed to avoid contact with any electrical hazard.

8) Emergency Response Recommendations

Initiation of emergency response shall be activated per current protocol. If there is any threat or potential threat to life or safety, 911 shall be called immediately to summon the aid of public safety responders. An initial scene assessment shall be conducted from all sides (360-degree scene size-up) if possible, and a clear concise assessment shall be given to incoming responders. Hazards and facility safety concerns such as high voltage areas or other electrical concerns shall be announced to all responders. The scene assessment shall include the following in plain language (No code or terms):

- Where the incident is located,
- What has happened,
- What is occurring,
- Any injuries or unaccounted for individuals,
- What the needs/resources should be requested.

An Incident Command System (ICS) shall be established immediately and shall include designation of roles. The primary command post location will be at a to-be-determined location . If public safety is summoned to the incident, the ICS shall be a Unified Incident Command System.

Onsite staff and visitors shall immediately go to a designated muster point for accountability, which will be the command post location unless designated differently by Incident Command. Incident Command shall designate the individual in charge of accountability. Accountability shall be reported as soon as possible. If available, another individual shall control any traffic and guide first responders into the scene.

At the same time as these activities are occurring the Emergency Contact shall immediately establish available data from the Battery Management System (BMS) and communicate this to the appropriate incident command individual.

9) Specific Recommendations (By Type of Emergency)

9.1) Fire

When sensors within the BESS enclosures (e.g., BMS) detect conditions that indicate a fire, an audible alarm will sound, and a visual strobe will flash on the enclosure exterior. Smoke and flame may be visible from the outside of the BESS enclosure. Fire growth can be slow, fast, or ultra-fast (e.g., deflagration) in nature.

The batteries in this facility are designed to NOT spread if a specific unit fails and begins to burn. The primary approach is to protect exposures as needed and let the unit burn itself out.

A safe stand-off distance shall be maintained between individuals and the BESS enclosure exhibiting fire conditions. Staging of personnel and equipment shall be on the angles of the BESS enclosure, to stay out of the potential blast radius of any doors or other potential projectiles. Attempt to extinguish the fire only if imminent threat to life safety exists.

If there is no immediate threat to life safety:

Unless there is an immediate threat to life safety or similar threat, a defensive fire attack should be used.

1. **Allow the BESS to burn in a controlled fashion** until all fuel sources inside are depleted.
2. A defensive approach should be considered utilizing water to cool and protect adjacent exposures and mitigate the spread of fire to areas outside of the fenced installation. Remove or protect adjacent vegetation through routine maintenance program to avoid providing an additional fuel source which may aid the spread of fire.
3. Remember that even after the BESS is isolated from the electric grid there will still be considerable stored energy in the batteries that poses a potential electric shock hazard to anyone in the nearby vicinity.

Chemicals released during a fire or explosion will be in a gaseous form and primarily pose an inhalation hazard. A fog pattern from a handline or monitor nozzle may be an effective way to control the off-gassing event on the exterior of the battery container from migrating to unwanted areas. However, if water is used in extinguishing flames, these gases can become acids which may cause skin irritation.

******** WARNING ********
The risk of battery re-ignition and/or secondary ignition remains present for hours or even days after the smoke/flame was initially detected. Even if a lithium-ion battery fire has been extinguished, there is still a risk of re-ignition.

Water curtains or hose streams may be applied to adjacent exposures for cooling purposes. If any indicators are present of damage or heat to an adjacent system, the BMS data shall be closely monitored for the adjacent system and relayed to the appropriate individual within the Incident Command System.

Following partial or complete consumption of the system by fire, batteries may continue to emit low levels of flammable gases and dangerous levels of toxic gases for an extended period of time. Continuous monitoring of gas levels in and around the incident location is recommended to be

conducted and use of mechanical ventilation may be utilized to manage gas levels. Full firefighter PPE and SCBA shall be utilized until gas levels are confirmed to be at a safe level. A Firewatch shall be performed for a minimum of 24 hours after any fire incident.

The initial Fire Department water supply will be from fire apparatus and water tankers (tenders) for shuttling water to the site. Secondary water sources if needed include local bogs and ponds.

9.2) Deflagration/Explosion

Tesla Megapacks are designed to minimize the potential of a deflagration or explosion occurring. Still, a safe stand-off distance shall be maintained between individuals and the BESS enclosure exhibiting fire conditions. Staging of personnel and equipment shall be on the angles of the BESS enclosure, to stay out of the potential blast radius of any doors or other potential projectiles. Attempt to extinguish the fire only if imminent threat to life safety exists.

Lithium batteries off-gas when heated or when subjected to electrical or physical damage. These gasses can accumulate inside the battery container at levels above the Lower Explosive Limit (LEL). While it is highly cautioned against that an enclosure door be opened during an off-gassing or fire event, should the need arise, the following precautions shall be taken:

- The responder, if preparing to open any door or compartment, shall stand to the side to eliminate the risk of being directly in the path of the blast pressure if an explosion were to occur.
- Gas monitoring should be continuously conducted, and gas meters shall be affixed to all responders to warn of potential atmospheric risks.
- Gas readings outside the battery cabinet, if the doors remain closed, should not be considered indicative of conditions inside the enclosure.
- Any ignition source inside or near the BESS enclosure can potentially cause the flammable gasses to ignite and/or explode.

9.3) Electric Shock

All BESS systems and related electrical equipment shall always be treated as energized (Energetic Hazardous Material).

Even though a battery may look to be destroyed by fire and/or other means, there is great potential that the battery still has stranded energy and remains energized. De-energization of the system or any removal of the battery or battery component shall only be performed by a trained and competent individual with appropriate PPE.

Note: ESRG strongly advises against the fire department attempting to overhaul the Megapack enclosure as there are considerations for handling damaged batteries requiring equipment and expertise not readily available. Once the scene is secured, these actions may be undertaken by trained experts under close supervision.

9.4) Arc Flash

***** CAUTION *****
Always treat the batteries as Energetic Hazardous Material, as they will maintain their state of charge (SOC) long after being isolated.

All BESS systems and related electrical equipment shall always be treated as energized (Energetic Hazardous Material).

Qualified PPE and training is required when working or accessing equipment within an Arc Flash Boundary. In general, when in direct proximity of the battery enclosure, wear non-melting or untreated natural fiber long-sleeve shirt, long pants, safety glasses, hearing protection, and leather gloves. AR plant clothing is also acceptable. Maintain arc flash boundary until completion of any particular task.

Arc Flash Boundary for Tesla Megapack Batteries at 100% SOC: (TBD during the engineering design process)

9.5) Chemical Release

The BESS site perimeter should not be entered during a fire or off-gassing event unless there is an imminent threat to life safety, at which time only properly trained and equipped public safety personnel may enter. This entry shall be with full firefighter protective gear to include self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). The entry in this situation shall be at the sole discretion of the officer in charge (OIC).

Chemicals consumed during a thermal runaway event will produce copious amounts of smoke. However, if water is used in extinguishing flames, these gasses can become acids which may cause skin irritation.

9.6) Drainage and Water Run-Off

The area surrounding the BESS project includes wetlands and cranberry bogs, and special attention should be given to water run-off from firefighting efforts. The facility has significant drainage capabilities built into the site location as mentioned in section 5 of this ERP (Water run-off). A containment and removal plan, similar to an electric utility substation SPCC is to be employed prior to commissioning.

10) System Specific Fire Protection & Safety Controls

10.1) Site Alarm Panel

To be determined.

10.2) Audible Alarm

To be determined. The purpose will be to alert any person in the immediate area of the facility.

10.3) Emergency Stop (E-Stop)

To be determined. These are located at multiple locations in and near the facility, and specifically at _____.

It should be noted that there is no delay in the activation of the emergency stop button (E-Stop). ***Always treat the batteries as Energetic Hazardous Material as the batteries will maintain their state of charge (SOC) and are energized up to the switchgear.***

The following summarizes the E-Stops for this facility. *(Note: Additional information on E Stop design and location will be provided, along with the process for remote activation via the NOC as the plan nears finalization.)*

- Installation E-Stop Conceptual Design – These are located at _____. The purpose is to disconnect the inverter from the grid.
- Battery Enclosure E-Stops – These are located on each battery enclosure. The purpose is to open contacts and isolate individual Megapack units.

******** CAUTION ********
Always treat the batteries as Energetic Hazardous Material, as they will maintain their state of charge (SOC) long after the activation of E-Stops.

Power isolation and shut-off should be conducted in coordination with the facility SME (see Appendix D). The following is excerpted from the Tesla ERP for Emergency Power Shutoff:

1) If an external E-stop button or remote shutdown contact to Megapack is present, engage it.
2) If Megapack is serviced upstream by an external AC breaker or disconnect, open the breaker or disconnect.
3) Only if safe to do so, open the customer interface bay door to access the AC breaker, remove the DC lockout key, and apply Lock Out, Tag Out (LOTO) if needed.

Appendix A – Safety Data Sheets (SDS)

If the information is available and able to be shared, insert SDS(s) for the TESLA Megapack and any other hazardous materials or processes that are important to the local emergency responders.

Appendix B – Site Specific Signage, hazards, placarding: (Example Signs)



Figure B1 – Example of ESS Signage



Figure B2 – Example of Danger Signage

Appendix C – Proposed Site Layout



Figure C1 – Proposed Site Layout

Appendix D – Subject Matter Expert (SME) Incident Response

The following information outlines Plus Power's plan for responding to an incident at the BESS installation site. Response is based on one or more qualified Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) responding to the site to support the local fire department and other emergency responders. This covers initial alarm activation, representative response, representative qualifications, anticipated actions, transition of command, recovery and/or decommissioning process.

D-1) Notification. Plus Power will be utilizing Tesla's Network Operations Center that operates 24/7 monitoring the safety and health of the BESS Installation. Based on remote monitoring, when certain thresholds are reached an alert signal will be sent to a Central Station that in turn transmits to the Carver Fire Department Dispatch Center. As per response protocols that will be developed in conjunction with the local fire department, an alarm will be generated for response.

D-2) SME Response. Plus Power will dispatch a representative (SME) to the scene within time frames acceptable to the local fire department. The representative that responds to the scene will have the following background and duties:

- A working knowledge of the energy storage system and the safety concerns of lithium-ion batteries;
- Fire Service operational familiarity;
- Specific familiarity with the ERP, design, and fire protection as pertains to the BESS installation;
- SME will interpret this information for the IC at the site;
- Upon arrival SME will confer with the IC and assist in the development of a tactical action plan; and
- SME will remain available to advise all stakeholders on the risks posed by the system.

D-3) Responsibility. Plus Power SME Representative will assume responsibility for securing the scene, assuming the fire has been contained, or will provide guidance based on available data and expertise on how to contain the fire or event. The Plus Power Representative will also:

- Determine whether a hazmat mitigation effort is necessary and will coordinate with hazmat partners to perform work if necessary; and
- Will coordinate with the local fire department, if necessary, to establish a fire watch and isolate any other affected parts of the system.

D-4) Scene Coordination. Upon securing the scene Plus Power personnel will coordinate with Tesla remotely to:

- Isolate the affected system if not already accomplished;
- Assess the condition of adjacent systems;
- Return the system to operation if safe to do so and with consultation of fire department command;
- Establish a perimeter around the installation ensuring the fenced area is secure;

- Begin the process of determining how to render safe the affected system and/or return it to service;
- Alternatively, begin the process of safely decommissioning the system by making the appropriate notifications and beginning to develop a recovery plan; and
- Determine next steps for performing a fire investigation and which parties should be notified.

D-5) Restoration Work. Tesla Megapack strategy of allowing the troubled unit to consume itself serves to limit the amount of stranded energy that would need to be dissipated during the restoration phase of the event.

During restoration, investigation, and disposal, the SME will:

- Work with stakeholders to determine what degree of restoration may be performed with respect to continuity of operations, spoliation of evidence, and overall safety;
- Act as investigator for Plus Power or help begin and facilitate investigation process; and
- Work with hazmat and disposal partners following completion of the investigation to ensure the system is properly secured and to determine the appropriate course of action for disposing of the system.

Appendix E – ESS Information Card (EIC)

This section provides the fundamental site information that is important for emergency responders to an emergency incident at Cranberry Point Battery Energy Storage Project.

ESS Information Card (EIC)

Cranberry Point Battery Energy Storage Project

31R Main St., Carver, MA 02330

Local & State Emergency Response Agencies: Emergency: 911

Facility Emergency Contact Phone Number: Plus Power _____



Facility Overview

Provide color coding in above drawing for all key features (with a legend) that are important for emergency responders, such as BESS, nearby exposures, access roads, water supply locations, rendezvous points, drainage etc.



Typical Battery Energy Storage Unit (multiple on-site)

EIC Sheet 1 of 2

ESS Information Card (EIC)

Cranberry Point Battery Energy Storage Project

31R Main St., Carver, MA 02330

EVENT: Fire:
Include key ERP details

EVENT: Deflagration/Explosion:
Include key ERP details

EVENT: Electric Shock:
Include key ERP details

EVENT: Arc Flash:
Include key ERP details

EVENT: Chemical Release:
Include key ERP details

EVENT: Water Run-Off:
Include key ERP details

Communications:
Include key ERP details

Emergency Stop:
Include key ERP details

Alarms:
Include key ERP details

Key Contacts:
Include key ERP details

EIC Sheet 2 of 2